为了活跃厦门大学会计学科的学术研究氛围，激发既有教师与在校研究生的学术研究热情和积极性，促进教师之间、教师与研究生之间、研究生彼此之间的深入交流、思想碰撞与知识分享，我们组织了由厦门大学会计学科的常任教师、博(硕)士研究生、国际访问学者等作为报告人的系列Seminar。该Seminar将冠以“厦门大学会计学科教师与研究生系列Seminar”的总标题，从2017年3月14日起，每周周二下午15:00-17:30举行。该Seminar与已有的“财务、会计Seminar”(主要聘请校外与境外的学者担任报告人) 相互补充，以期能够更好地推动厦门大学会计学科的学术发展。
题 目：Audit Committee Equity Compensation and Auditor Selection and Retention
报 告 人：刘馨茗 助理教授
主 持 人：张国清 教授
时 间：2018年10月30日（星期二），15:00-17:30
地 点：嘉庚二203室
论文摘要：Section 301 of SOX assumes that audit committees can independently exercise their responsibility for auditor selection and retention in the post-SOX period. However, there is little empirical evidence supporting this assumption. We examine whether equity compensation induces audit committees to compromise independence in making their auditor selection and retention decisions. Using a sample of 6,697 firm-year observations during 2007-2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and selection of an industry expert auditor. We also document that audit committees that receive larger equity compensation are more likely to dismiss their auditors when the auditors issue an unfavorable audit opinion, and that the earnings quality of firms that dismiss their auditors decreases. The negative relation between equity compensation and audit committee independence is robust to controlling for endogeneity, Lennox’s (2000) opinion shopping framework, alternative definitions of an industry expert auditor, alternative measures of equity compensation, and alternative samples. However, this negative relation does not exist when firms face high litigation risk, the AC chair is less powerful than the CFO, and the audit committee comprises a high proportion of accounting experts. Our empirical results bear important implications for recent regulations and standards.
